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INTRODUCTION

"Out of these troubled times," President Bush told a joint session
of Congress in September 1990, "a new world order can emerge, a
new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the
nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and
live in harmony."t
Bush spoke against the backdrop of the military confrontation in
the Persian Gulf. The concerted United Nations (U.N.) action, the
opposition to aggression, he said, heralded an era in which international conflicts could be managed, and in which aggression would no
longer be feasible. The international community, free of the scourge
of war, could address itself to other serious problems confronting the
planet. It would be, Bush said, "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the
shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the
• Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University.
1. Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1990, at A20. See also Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1990, at A 11 (Bush stating, "as I look at the countries that are chipping in here now,
I think we do have a chance at a new world order").
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strong respect the rights of the weak." Bush said that "America and
the world must support the rule of law. And," he promised, "we
will." 2
Bush's view of the Persian Gulf situation was not universally
shared. Some regarded the United States' outrage over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as selective. They pointed to other situations in which
the United States had condoned or perpetrated aggression. The
United States, they said, manipulated the United Nations, taking advantage of the Soviet Union's internal weakness. From this perspective, the Persian Gulf situation bespoke not a new era of harmony but
a continuation of United States dominance over Third World resources, backed by the use or threat of military force. It was anything
but a harbinger of a bright future. These critics also pointed to the
United States' 1989 invasion of Panama, which was widely condemned as aggression, as further evidence that a new era of harmony
was but a distant dream.
If a new world order is to emerge, it must, as President Bush
said, be based on the rule of law in the world community. A prerequisite to the emergence of a new world order is adherence to the rule of
law by the United States, the only functioning superpower. A critical
question, therefore, is the United States' commitment to the rule of
law.
This article reviews the United States' recent practices, both executive and congressional, to assess whether they bespeak an adherence to the rule of law. The article explores two aspects of United
States practice: the extent to which the United States works cooperatively through international organizations, and the frequency with
which it resorts to use of armed force.

II.

THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A major postulate of the new world order, as expounded by President Bush, is cooperation through international institutions to solve
world problems. The Reagan Administration did not look to international organizations as a forum in which to resolve major issues. For
the most part, it "avoid[ed] multilateral institutions and accountabilities. " 3 To the extent that it worked through international organiza2. Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1990, at A20. See also Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1990, at A 11.
3. Bums H. Weston, Lawyers and the Search for Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 451, 464 (1985). See also Bums H. Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus
International Law, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295 (1987).
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tions, the Reagan Administration adopted a confrontational
approach. This approach, said analysts, involved a "radical new theory about international law and institutions, " 4 and "a dramatic break
with past administrations. "s
In the early years of the U.N. and the Organization of American
States (0.A.S.), the United States found most other members prepared to follow its lead. With the end of colonialism in the 1960s and
1970s, however, the voices of the formerly dispossessed peoples were
heard. In the United Nations, emancipated colonies promoted new
principles. Meanwhile, in the 0.A.S., the Latin states began to assert
themselves. The Reagan Administration's adversarial approach was a
reaction against a loss of control.
In international organizations, the Reagan Administration
sought less to reconcile conflicting interests than to advance its own
agenda. Ambassador Alan L. Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, explained, "[w]e must create in
the United Nations and in other international organizations a political
environment that is conducive to the pursuit of well-articulated and
carefully defined U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives." 6
That statement alone might not have been objectionable, since
each state pursues its own objectives. The Reagan Administration,
however, carried this approach to an extreme. Secretary of State
George Shultz criticized prior administrations for being too conciliatory at the U.N. "While other[] [states] worked hard to organize and
influence voting blocs to further their interests and promote their ideologies," he complained, "the United States did not make similar exertions on behalf of our values and our ideals." 7 In the U.N. General
Assembly, the Administration's promotion of its own agenda increasingly put it in a small minority when voting on resolutions. In the
Security Council, the Administration increasingly resorted to use of
its veto power.
The Reagan Administration pressured states that opposed its positions. For example, the General Assembly's decolonization committee expressed doubts that Puerto Rico was self-governing and asked
4. Thomas M. Franck & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's
Commitment to Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A
CROSSROADS 3 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).
5. Id. at 5.
6. FY 1987 Assistance Requests for Organizations and Programs, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug.
1986, at 80.
7. The United Nations After 40 Years: Idealism and Realism, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Aug.
1985, at 18, 20 (emphasis in original).
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the Assembly to "examine the question of Puerto Rico. " 8 In response, the Administration threatened to cut aid to developing states
that appeared likely to vote in the Assembly to take up the Puerto
Rico issue. 9 The Administration took the position that Puerto Rico
had achieved self-determination and did not want the Assembly to
study that question. to The Assembly succumbed to this pressure and
voted to keep the issue off its agenda. t 1
Resisting a strong international consensus, the Reagan Administration opposed the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the
Sea, probably the most important multilateral treaty of the era.
Although the United States played a key role in negotiating the treaty
in the 1970s, the Administration voted against its final text. 12 It opposed the Convention's provisions to establish an international authority over mineral mining in the deep seabed, viewing these
provisions as overly restrictive of U.S. mining companies. 13 The Administration insisted on a view, rejected by most other states, that
deep seabed mining was protected by the concept of freedom of the
seas. 14 The Administration's position on the Law of the Sea Convention set back efforts to achieve universally accepted norms to regulate
the seas. On a similar rationale, the Reagan Administration opposed
the General Assembly's Moon Treaty, which called for international
control of the moon's mineral resources. 1s
The above-mentioned policy statements and positions are evidence of the Reagan Administration's low regard for working in a
8. Puerto Rico: Action by the Committee on Colonial Countries, 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1113
(Vote: 11 - 2 - 11), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/677 (1981).
9. Michael J. Berlin, U.S. Wins U.N. Vote on Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1982, at
Al (quoting U.S. Deputy Representative Kenneth Adelman that U.S. mission had indicated to
states considering abstention that abstention "would be unfavorably met in bilateral relations
and on Capitol Hill").
10. John Quigley, The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-Governing Territory: The
Case of United States Bases in Puerto Rico, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 323, 343 - 44 (1988).
11. See Puerto Rico: Action By the Committee on Colonial Countries, 1982 U.N.Y.B.
1276; Michael J. Berlin, U.S. Wins U.N. Vote on Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1982, at
Al (a vote against inclusion of Puerto Rico question on Assembly agenda Sept. 24, 1982,
carried 70 - 30 - 43); A/location of Agenda Items, U.N. GAOR, 31th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
12. U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 71 (statement by President Reagan on July 9, 1982).
13. See HOUSE SUB. COMM. ON OcEANOGRAPHY, DEEP SEABED MINING, H.R. 3350
and H.R. 4582, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 135, 191, 205, 228, 311, 345 (1977)(statements of
corporate representatives).
14. James L. Malone, Freedom and Opportunities: Foundation for a Dynamic Oceans
Policy, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 76.
15. See Elliot L. Richardson, In Pursuit of a Law of the Sea, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1980,
at A22.
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collaborative fashion with other states over issues of mutual concern.
One major mechanism for international collaboration to which the
Administration gave low priority was adjudicatory processes.

A.

International Adjudication

If the rule of law is to prevail in the world community, states
must resolve their disputes in accordance with internationally accepted principles. A primary mechanism for achieving this end is international adjudication.
The Reagan Administration limited international cooperation in
the resolution of disputes by adjudication. The Administration, as the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) later determined, committed aggression against Nicaragua in the early 1980s. 16 But in 1984, when
Nicaragua was about to sue the United States over that aggression,
the Administration filed with the Court a new exception to the United
States' 1946 acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. The new exception was that the United States would not submit itself to the Court's
jurisdiction for two years, regarding "disputes with any Central
American State or arising out of or related to events in Central
America." 17 · Since acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
is based on consent, 18 the new document was intended to prevent the
Court from hearing Nicaragua's complaint.
After Nicaragua filed, however, the Court decided that the
United States was bound by a clause in its 1946 acceptance that promised it would not withdraw the acceptance without giving six months
notice. The Court found that the Administration violated that undertaking by trying to avoid Nicaragua's suit. 19
As an additional objection to Nicaragua's suit, the Administration argued that only the Security Council may handle ongoing military conflict. 20 Although the conflict was ongoing, the acts of
aggression alleged by Nicaragua had already occurred. The fact that
the conflict continued was no obstacle to a determination of Nicaragua's claim. The United States' position, if accepted, would have
16. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 l.C.J. 22 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case).
17. 39 l.C.J.Y.B. 100 (1984) (letter of Secretary of State George Shultz).
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, appended to U .N. CHARTER, 59
Stat.1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
19. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 419, 431 (Report of Judgements).
20. Id. at 434 (International Court of Justice, Counter-Memorial submitted by the United
States) [hereinafter U.S. Counter-Memorial]. See also, Isaak I. Dore, The United States, SelfDefense and the U.N. Charter: A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Legal Reasoning, 24
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1987).
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meant that an aggressor could escape judicial condemnation by continuing to commit aggression. Rejecting this position, the Court
found Nicaragua's application admissible. 21 The United States position would have dealt a serious blow to the resolution of international
disputes by adjudication, for it would have deprived the Court of the
ability to hear disputes involving the most serious international issue,
armed conflict.
At that point the United States withdrew from the case, refusing
to take part in further proceedings. 22 Then it withdrew entirely its
1946 acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, 23 giving as its
reason the Court's finding in the Nicaragua case. It called the ruling
on admissibility a threat to U.S. security:
For the United States to recognize that the ICJ has authority to define and adjudicate with respect to our right of self-defense, therefore,
is effectively to surrender to that body the power to pass on our efforts to guarantee the safety and security of this nation and of its
allies. 24

Although a state using force determines that it is being invaded,
it does not have the final word on whether its invocation of self-defense was proper. "The question of the legality of self-defense loses its
essential meaning," wrote one analyst, "if the answer is left solely to
the judgment of the state purporting to exercise that right. " 25
Although the Security Council has competence under the Charter regarding breaches of the peace, 26 that competence is not exclusive of
the jurisdiction of the Court, 27 which has accepted cases involving
aggression. 28
Unfortunately, the United States' tum away from the Court
came as the U.S.S.R., which had never accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, 29 was contemplating doing so. Soviet President
21. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 435, 440, 441.
22. United States: Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 I.L.M., 246, 248 (1985).
23. U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan.
1986, at 67 (text of Oct. 7, 1985, letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to U.N. Secretary
General giving six months notice to terminate).
24. Id. at 70.
25. Oscar Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 223, 230 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed. 1987).
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
27. Schachter, supra note 25, at 231.
28. Id. at 223, 224 (discussing Corfu Channel case).
29. Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov's
Jurisprudential Legacy, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 364, 365, 366 (1964).
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Mikhail Gorbachev urged that the five permanent members of the Security Council agree on common criteria under which to accept the
Court's jurisdiction. 30 The United States did not respond to this
initiative.
Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Donald McHenry, reflecting on President Reagan's first term in office, observed
that the administration was pursuing:
a broad attack on the U.N. system and on the concept of U.S. participation in any institution which the United States does not dominate.
It is an attempt to sail against the current of interdependence and a
rejection of the idealistic notion that our long-term interests are best
served by the rule of law and by the nurturing of institutions which
attempt to improve relations among nations. 31

Ambassador McHenry said that the United States was joining "the
ranks of the lawless" and ignoring criticism, not only by traditional
adversaries, but also by close allies. 32
The administration's retreat on international adjudication represented a significant withdrawal from a rule of law policy by the
United States. It reduced the range of problems that might be resolved through adjudication and increased the number that might
cause serious friction.

B.

Dues in International Organizations

If the new world order is to be based on the rule of law, states
must work collaboratively to make international organizations function. Those organizations operate on the basis of dues contributed by
member states. The United States, because of its economic status, is a
major financial contributor. The past decade, however, witnessed a
reluctance on the part of the United States to make payments, as a
result of its objections to certain aspects of the activity of the organizations. In one important instance, it withdrew from membership.
During the 1980s, the United States had a major confrontation
with members of the United Nations over the payment of its assessed
dues. Both the Administration and Congress took the initiative in
objecting to paying for U.N. programs.
30. Mikhail Gorbachev, Rea/'nost' i garantii bezopasnogo mira [Reality and Guarantees
of a Secure World], PRAVDA, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1.
31 . Donald McHenry, Address given at the Annual Dinner held during the 78th Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1984 reprinted in AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 318, 319 (1984).
32. Id.

Published by SURFACE, 1992

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 6

82

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 18:75

In the early years of the U.N., when the U.S. was not seriously
challenged, it paid its due assessments for the U.N. as a whole, and
for its specialized agencies. In the 1970s, however, Congress began to
balk at the assessments as Third World states increasingly opposed
U.S. policy at the U.N.3 3
In the early 1980s, for the first time the President began to take
the lead in withholding payments to object to U.N. programs of
which he disapproved, and Congress became more active as well. Beginning in 1982, President Reagan refused to pay the United States'
assessed expenses for the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission. 34
In 1983, Congress called for a withholding of 25% of the United
States' assessment for programs connected with the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the
Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, and for projects that would benefit
either the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the South West
Africa People's Organization (S.W.A.P.0.). 3'
In 1985, Congress ordered a 25% withholding for funds that
would be used for the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination, for the construction of a headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa, and for any implementation of the
General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism. 36
These Congressionally-ordered payment reductions violated the
33. By way of exception, it should be noted that in 1972 Congress reduced the U.S. share
of total assessments in U.N. and specialized agencies (exceptions for the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and peacekeeping operations).
P.L. 92 - 544, Title I, § 101, 86 Stat. 1110, amended by P.L. 94 - 141, Title II, § 203, 89 Stat.
762. This led to a reduction of the United States assessment to 25%. See Richard W. Nelson,
International Law and U.S. Withholding of Payments to International Organizations, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 973, 978 (1986). From 1974 to 1976, Congress withheld payments to UNESCO after
UNESCO refused to permit Israel to join its European regional group and criticized Israel for
altering historic sites in Jerusalem. See Leo Gross, On the Degradation of the Constitutional
Environment of the United Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 (1983).
34. Statement of President Ronald Reagan, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1652 (Dec. 30, 1982). See also
Patrick J. Hynes, Note, United Nations Financing of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission: May the United States Withhold Payment?, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 472 (1985); Nelson,
supra note 33, at 974.
35. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, § 114(a), Pub.
L. No. 98 - 164, Title I,§ 114, 97 Stat. 1017, 1020, amended by Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99 - 93, Title I,§ 144, 99 Stat. 424 and by
Pub. L. No. 100 - 204, Title VII, § 705, 101 Stat. 1390 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 287(e) note).
36. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99 93, Title I, § 144, 99 Stat. 405, 424 - 425 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 287e note) (Supp. III 1985).
See G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975)
(The Assembly had given no indication that it contemplated any expenditure of funds to implement the resolution.).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/6

8

Quigley: The New World Order and the Rule of Law

1992]

New World Order and the Rule of Law

83

budget provisions of the U.N. Charter. 37 Every member state does
not find every United Nations program to its liking, but a state must
contribute to the budget as assessed. It may not pick and choose.
After several states refused to contribute assessed monies to programs
of which they disapproved, the ICJ ruled that U.N. member states
must contribute for all assessed expenditures. 38
In 1985, the United States began to withhold partial payments of
assessments to object to U.N. budget procedures. The United States
felt the procedures gave smaller states too great a role. Congress
adopted the Kassebaum amendment, which called for a 20% reduction in U.S. payment of its assessments to the U.N. and its specialized
agencies, until those organizations allowed member states to vote in
proportion to their contributions in setting the budget. 39
The Kassebaum amendment violated the United States' obligations to the U.N. The Charter of the U.N. and the constitutions of its
specialized agencies do not contemplate consensus procedures to set
budgets. 40 For the United Nations, the annual budget is fixed by the
General Assembly, 41 which then determines the shares to be paid by
each state. 42 On both the issue of adopting a budget and of allocating
the dues obligation among member states, the Assembly operates on a
two-thirds majority vote. 43 By ratifying the United Nations Charter,44 the United States agreed to these budget provisions and to make
payments as assessed. 45 The 1985 act violated these provisions, since
its call for voting on budget-setting in proportion to assessments was
inconsistent with the two-thirds majority procedure. 46 In 1987, in response to the U.S. objections, the General Assembly took steps to in37. U.N. CHARTER, art. 19. See infra note 46.
38. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the U.N. Charter)
(adv. op.), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 26). See also Nelson, supra note 33, at 978 - 79 (noting
that both the State Department and Congress approved the Court's approach).
39. Pub. L. No. 99 - 93, supra note 36, Title I, § 143.
40. Id. at 633 (as to U.N.).
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 17(1).
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 17(2). Nelson, supra note 33, at 977 - 78.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 18(2). Nelson, supra note 33, at 974.
44. ICJ Statute, supra note 18.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 19.
46. See 131 CONG. REc. S7794 (daily ed. June 7, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias that
the provision would put the United States in violation of its Charter obligations); Nelson, supra
note 33, at 974 (noting that the U.N. budget procedure called for by the 1985 act would
require an amendment of Charter art. 18); Thomas M. Franck, Unnecessary U.N.-Bashing
Should Stop, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 336 (1986) ("Across-the-board unilateral cuts in the U.S.
contribution to the United Nations are a violation of Article 17 of the UN Charter and, thus,
of a cardinal U.S. treaty commitment."); EEC: Memorandum to the United States Concerning
the Financial Situation of the United Nations, Mar. 14, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 482 (1986)
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volve member states more fully in the budget process, 47 but the
Assembly did not deviate from the Charter procedures for voting on
the budget. 48
By 1990, the United States was in danger of losing its vote in the
Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.0.). 49 The U.S. arrears totaled nearly two years of its dues. so The arrears built up from nonpayment attributable to the Kassebaum amendment.s 1
In 1988, the United States began a modest reversal on the U.N.
dues issue. It resumed full payment of current United Nations dues. s2
In 1989, it began payments on its arrears which totaled nearly $1 billion. By late 1990, it still owed $296 million. s3 In 1990, Congress
softened its language on budget procedures, requiring the President to
try to get the United Nations and its specialized agencies to set budgets through "consensus-based decision-making procedures" that "assure that sufficient attention is paid to the views of the United States
and other member states who are major financial contributors to such
assessed budgets. "s4 The 1990 language differed from prior language
in that it did not require that voting on the budget be based on contributions. However, the "consensus-based" procedures it contemplated
still varied from the Charter procedures. The 1990 act also used a
different formula for reducing the United States payment, putting the
(stating that implementation of Kassebaum amendment would put U.S. in violation of U.N.
Charter art. 17).
47. G.A. Res. 41/213, 41 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 57, U.N. Doc. A/41/
53 (1987), incorporating recommendations made in Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning
of the United Nations, 41 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/41/49 (1986).
With regard to the Group of Experts, see Nelson, supra note 33, at 975.
48. Elisabeth Zoller, The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the Rights of the
Minority, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 610, 634 (1987).
49. FOOD AGRIC. ORG. CoNST., 12 U.S.T. 980 (as amended 1959).
50. Paul Lewis, U.S. and U.N. Food Agency Head fora Clash, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1990,
at AlO. See FOOD AGRIC. ORG. CONST., supra note 49, art. 18(2) ("Each Member Nation
undertakes to contribute annually to the Organization its share of the budget, as apportioned
by the Conference."), art. 3(4) (providing for loss of voting right if a state is two years behind
in dues payments).
51. Paul Lewis, U.S. and U.N. FoodAgencyHeadfora Clash. N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1990,
at AlO. The United States cited as an additional reason for non-payment a plan by the F.A.0.
to consult the Palestine Liberation Organization about F.A.O. work to help Palestinian farmers in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Id.
52. Richard S. Williamson, Developments in the UN System, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept.
1988, at 62, 64.
53. John M. Goshko, U.N. Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 1990, at Al.
54. An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for the Department
of State, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 405(b), 104 Stat. 15 (1990) [hereinafter An Act to authorize appropriations].
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onus on the President to determine whether appropriate procepures
were being used. It specified that the President must withhold 20% of
the funds appropriated by Congress to the United Nations, or a specialized agency, until he determines that it used "consensus-based decision-making procedures" as defined in the act. ss
In specialized agencies, as in the United Nations itself, the
United States used its financial clout to block programs it opposed. In
the World Health Organization (W.H.O.),s 6 the U.S. threatened to
withhold its dues if Palestine were admitted as a member state. s7 Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, called the threat "blackmail,"
as the U.S. then contributed one fourth of W.H.O.'s budget.s 8 The
W.H.O. Director General, fearful over the loss of revenue, asked the
PLO to withdraw its application.s 9 Ultimately the W.H.0. voted to
postpone the application, primarily because of the United States
pressure. 60
Such withholding would have violated the W.H.O. Constitution,
which requires payment of dues as apportioned by W.H.0. 61 Regardless of the merits of the Palestinian application, the admission of Palestine would not have amounted to a material breach of the
Constitution. 62 Even if it had been a breach, the withholding of such
a large share of the W.H.O. budget would have been a disproportionate response. 63
Beyond withholding dues, the United States began to use withdrawal as a weapon against international organizations whose polices
55. Id., § 405(c). The President must certify to Congress that such procedures are being
used. Id.
56. WORLD HEALTH ORO. CONST., 14 U.N.T.S. 185, 62 Stat. 2679, T.l.A.S. No. 1808.
57. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Health Agency Seeks Compromise on P.LO., N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1989, at AS; U.S. Warns WHO on Admitting PLO, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1989, at Al {statement of State Dept. spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler); Adam Pertman, US Vows Cutoff in
WHO Funds if PLO Joins, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1989, at Al {statement of Secretary of
State Baker of U.S. plan to end funding to W.H.O. if Palestine were admitted). Congress has
also threatened to terminate dues payments to the United Nations if Israel is expelled. See Pub.
L. No. 99 - 93 § 142, supra note 36.
58. Jonathan C. Randal, PLO Defeated in Bid to Join World Health Organization, WASH.
POST, May 13, 1989, at Al.
59. Norman Kempster, PLO Urged to Drop Bid to U.N. Unit; U.S. Warns It Would Withhold Money for Health Agency, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A9.
60. Jonathan C. Randal, PLO Defeated in Bid to Join World Health Organization, WASH.
POST, May 13, 1989, at Al; Burton Bollag, U.N. Health Agency Defers P.LO. Application to
1990, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at A3 (Vote: 83 - 47).
61. WORLD HEALTH ORO. CONST., supra note 56, arts. 7, 56.
62. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Admission of "Palestine" as a Member of a Specialized Agency
and Withholding the Payment of Assessments in Response, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 218, 223 - 25
(1990).
63. Id. at 226 - 27.
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it found inappropriate. It threatened to withdraw from, or suspend
financial contributions to, specialized agencies when Arab states
moved to expel Israel from such agencies. 64 In 1984, citing political
issues, the Reagan Administration withdrew the United States from
the U.N. Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESC0). 6 s
The Administration said that UNESCO promoted Third World views
directed against the West, 66 particularly on the issue of control of the
activities of Western news media in Third World states. 67 "UNESCO
policies," explained Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organizations, "have served anti-U.S. political
ends." 68 In addition to concern over press freedom, Newell mentioned "collectivist" trends in UNESCO, such as its espousal of the
New International Economic Order, whereby Third World states
sought to re-order their economic relations with the West to compensate for the profit the West gained during the colonial period. 69

64. U.S. Warns Arabs on Postal Ouster of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1984, at A9 (Universal Postal Union, 1984; International Atomic Energy Agency, 1982; International Telecommunications Union, 1982; International Labor Organization, 1977). The United States
withdrew from the l.L.O. in 1977, returning in 1980. See Leo Gross, On the Degradation of
the Constitutional Environment of the United Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 - 74 (1983).
See generally, WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN
AMERICAN VIEW (1981); Burton Bollag, U.N. Health Agency Defers P.L.0. Application to
1990, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at A3 (refers to a standing U.S. threat to withdraw from any
specialized agency that admits Palestine as member).
65. See U.S. Practice, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 427 (1984).
66. Heather A. Wilson, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Regime: The Rights of Peoples, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 670 (1989) (book review).
67. See Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Is Quitting UNESCO, Affirms Backing/or U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1983, at A4 (Alan Romberg, Dept. of State spokesperson, cited UNESCO's
"hostility toward . . . a free press" as a principal reason for withdrawal.). See also An Act to
authorize appropriations supra note 54, § 408(a)(2) (stating that U.S. withdrew in 1984 because of problems in UNESCO and that "chief among these problems" was "the assault on the
free ftow of information" and "the pervasive ideological conflict fomented by the alliance between totalitarian and developing nations"). UNESCO is the principal international organization for cultural issues, including scientific research, copyright relations, fine arts, education,
library exchanges, and preservation of cultural and historical monuments. See U.N. E:::>UCATIONAL, ScIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORG. CONST., Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275, 61 Stat.
2495, T.l.A.S. No. 1580, 3 Bevans 1311. See generally WALTER H. C. LAVES & CHARLES A.
THOMSON, UNESCO: PURPOSE, PROGRESS, PROSPECTS (1957).
68. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. In Quitting UNESCO, Affirms Backing for U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1983, at Al.
69. Id. See also Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 131.L.M. 715 (1974); CHARTER OF EcONOMIC RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF STATES, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 l.L.M. 251 (1975).
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The Bush Administration continued the UNESCO boycott. 70 In
1990, however, Congress said that some of the United States' concerns about UNESCO had been answered71 and asked the Secretary
of State to work with the UNESCO leadership "to promote the; progress necessary to justify United States consideration of reentry into
UNESCO. " 72
The practice reflected in the United States' policy towards international organizations in the Reagan and Bush Administrations has
been to exert strong financial pressure on them to make them act in
ways the Administrations considered appropriate, and to withdraw
funding or participation if the organizations did not comply. This
approach is at odds with the establishment of a world community
based on the rule of law. If international organizations are to function
effectively, they must be supported by member states, even when the
organizations undertake policies to which some member states dissent. With more than one hundred states in the major international
organizations, all policy decisions will engender dissent from some
members. If the dissenters withhold funding, the organizations will
not be able to carry out policy. International organizations are a key
element of the rule of law, yet the Reagan and Bush Administrations
have not shown a willingness to abide by majority approaches.
C.

Access to the United Nations

If the United Nations is to function effectively, it must be able to
invite to its proceedings the parties involved in international disputes.
With the United Nations headquarters located in New York, this imposes a special obligation on the United States.
In 1987, for the first time, the United States took action limiting
the access of accredited delegates to the U.N. headquarters in New
York. 73 Congress passed legislation to close the Palestine Liberation
Organization mission at the United Nations, 74 which had granted the
PLO observer status. 7 s The General Assembly resolved that the action would violate the United States' obligations to the U.N. 76 Under
70. Don Shannon, Next Step: U.N. Rides High After Cold War, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1990, at Hl.
71. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 408(a).
72. Id., § 408(b).
73. John Quigley, Congress and the P.L.O. and Conflicts Between Statutes and Treaties,
35 WAYNE L. REV. 83 (1988).
74. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100 - 204, 101 Stat. 1406, 1407 (1988).
75. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
76. G.A. Res. 42/210B, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. (1988), reported in 22
U.N.L. REP. 53 (1988)(Vote: 145 - 1). See also U.S. Seeks to Keep P.L.O. Office Open, N.Y.
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the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the
United Nations, the United States was not to "impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district" by "persons
invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations ... on official business. " 77
Deciding that a dispute existed between the United States and
the U.N. under the Headquarters Agreement, 78 the General Assembly
asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether, under an arbitration provision of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States
must arbitrate this dispute with the U.N. 79 Rather than wait for an
answer, the U.S. Department of Justice ordered the PLO to close its
U.N. mission in New York, 80 and when it did not, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The ICJ ruled that the United States was obliged to arbitrate its
dispute with the U.N. 81 The United States refused. That issue became
moot, however, when the District Court ruled against the Justice Department. The court said that the 1987 Act did not expressly state
that it was to prevail over the Headquarters Agreement, and, therefore, that the Agreement took precedence. 82 After the State Department expressed concern over the issue, the Justice Department did
not appeal this ruling. 83
The following year the State Department refused a visa to PLO
Chairman Yassir Arafat, who had been invited to speak at a General
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1987, at A3. See Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, U.S.-U.N., 61 Stat. 3416, T.l.A.S. No. 1676 [hereinafter Headquarters
Agreement].
77. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 76, art. IV § 11.
78. G.A. Res. 42/229A (1988), reported in 22 U.N.L. REP. 62 (1988) (Vote: 143 - 1).
79. G.A. Res. 42/229B, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.104 (1988) at 58, reported in 22
U.N.L. REP. 62 (1988) (Vote: unanimous (Israel and U.S.A. not participating)).
80. See Robert Pear, Washington Talk P.L.O. Told to Shut Mission in JO Days, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1988, at §§ 1 & 4 (City ed.); U.S. Reluctantly Orders PLO to Close U.N.
Mission as New Law Requires, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1988, at A21. The Act was adopted
Dec. 22, 1987, to take effect 90 days later. The Attorney General gave the mission notice Mar.
11, 1988, to close by Mar. 21, 1988. See U.S. Seeks to Keep P.L.O. Office Open, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1987, at A3.
81. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.A.), 19881.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26) (adv. op),
no. 77.
82. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 690 F. Supp. 1243, 1243 - 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a subsequent act of Congress prevails over a treaty obligation, as a matter of U.S. domestic law, only if
the act evidences an explicit intent to override the treaty obligation).
83. U.S. Will Allow P.L.O. to Maintain Its Office at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at
Al ("It was decided, in light offoreign policy considerations, including the U.S. role as host to
the United Nations organization, not to appeal in this instance.").
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Assembly session in New York. 84 The Department gave as its reason
terrorist acts committed by the PL0. 85 Because the PLO was accredited as an observer, however, the refusal to admit Arafat violated the
Headquarters Agreement. 86 The General Assembly moved its session
to Geneva to hear Arafat. In 1989, Arab states asked the General
Assembly to change the status of the PLO from an observer organization to a non-member state, after the PLO declared statehood in 1988.
The State Department threatened to withhold its U.N. dues if the resolution were adopted, and the proponents backed off. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said that any withholding of dues by the
United States would violate its dues obligations under the Charter. 87
The spat over access to U.N. headquarters for the PLO and
Arafat represented a serious violation by the United States of its obligation to host the organization. The U.N. must have the ability to
invite and receive necessary parties if it is to fulfill its mission. That
mission is crucial if the rule of law is to prevail in the world community. If the United States seeks to promote the rule of law, it must let
the U.N. invite whom it chooses.
D.

U.N. Voting Records of Other States

If international organizations are to function effectively, the
member states must be free to voice their views. Stronger states, however, have an ability to influence weaker states. The United States, as
a strong state, undertook a policy during the 1980s to pressure weaker
states.
Congress reacted to the United States' loss of control in the U.N.
In addition to passing a law to keep the PLO away from the U.N., it
ordered the Secretary of State to submit annual reports "with respect
to each foreign country member of the United Nations, [and] the voting practices of the governments of such countries at the United Nations."88 The reports were to "evaluate [the] General Assembly and
Security Council actions and the responsiveness of those governments
to United States' policy on issues of special importance to the United
84. Robert Pear, U.S. Denies Arafat Entry for Speech to Session of U.N. , N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1988, at Al.
85. U.S. Dept. of State Statement on the Visa Application of Yassir Arafat, reprinted in 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 254 (1989).
86. See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 76, art. IV. § 11. See also W. Michael Reisman, The Arafat Visa Affair: Exceeding the Bounds of Host State Discretion, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
519, 527 (1989).
87. Paul Lewis, Arabs at U.N. Relax Stand on P.LO., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1989, at A3.
88. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 406(a).

Published by SURFACE, 1992

15

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 6

90

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 18:75

States. " 89 They were to analyze "the extent to which member countries supported United States' policy objectives at the United Nations,"90 and provide a country-by-country breakdown for every
plenary vote in the General Assembly "on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United
States lobbied extensively."9t
For U .N. plenary session votes on all issues, the reports were to
provide "a comparison of the votes cast by each member country with
the vote cast by the United States." 92 They were also to analyze "the
extent to which other members supported United States' policy objectives in the Security Council" and give "a separate listing of all Security Council votes of each member country in comparison with the
United States. " 93
The Secretary of State was "to inform United States diplomatic
missions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council activities. " 94 The obvious, though unstated, intention was to enable ambassadors to pressure the host government. This practice
compromised the spirit of free and genuine participation that is necessary for the U.N. to operate as an effective institution.

E.

Panama and Iraq

One of the most important aspects of the work of the United
Nations is to cope with armed conflict. Yet in two situations the Bush
Administration itself resorted to armed force, acting alone, rather
than seeking a U.N. approach.
The Bush Administration paid little regard to international procedure in its 1989 military action in Panama. It had urged the O.A.S.
to pressure Gen. Manuel Noriega to resign from office as de facto
leader of Panama, and the O.A.S. did so. 9s But when this pressure
did not produce prompt results, the United States invaded and over89. Id., § 406(a).
90. Id., § 406(b)(l).
91. Id., § 406(b)(3)(a).
92. An Act to authorize appropriations, supra note 54, § 406 (b)(4).
93. Id., § 406(b)(5).
94. Id. , § 406(d).
95. See Larry Rohter, O.A.S. Draws Latin Fire for Stand on Panama, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 1989, at AlO; Robert Pear, Latin Envoys Report No Progress in Their Effort to Dislodge
Noriega, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1989, at A6; Robert Pear, Diplomats Urge Noriega to Resign by
Sept. 1, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A6; Diplomacy: Haunting Noriega issue stirs great hope
and low expectation as O.A.S. meets again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1989, at A20.
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threw Gen. Noriega. 96 Then the O.A.S., with the United States casting the lone negative vote, 97 "deeply deplored" the invasion and called
on the United States to withdraw immediately, stating that withdrawal was necessary to protect "the right of the Panamanian people
to self-determination without outside interference."98 The U.N. General Assembly also condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate U.S. withdrawal from Panama. 99
In the 1980s, the U.S.S.R. called for a stronger role for the Security Council in resolving international crises. The United States did
not respond to these proposals. President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that a U.N. mechanism be devised to monitor arms reduction
treaties, crisis situations, and even a state's military preparations that
seemed directed at aggression. 100 Military observers, he said, should
be sent more frequently as observers in conflict situations. 101 When
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S.S.R. proposed that the long
dormant Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, composed
of its five permanent members, coordinate whatever military action
might be taken by other states against Iraq or its shipping. 102 As a
result of its proposal, the Security Council's resolution on enforcement of the commercial blockade of Iraq asked member states to coordinate their vessel-searching activity through the Committee. 103
96. Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Troops Gain Wide Control in Panama,· New Leaders Put In,
But Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al.
97. See O.A.S., American Nations Assail U.S. Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15;
O.A.S. Votes to Censure U.S. for Intervention, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at A7.
98. O.A.S., American Nations Assail U.S. Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15. La
OEA dep/ora la invasion y exige un cese de/ fuego [The O.A.S. Deplores the Invasion and
Demands a Ceasefire], LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 4.
99. G.A. Res. 44/240, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (1989), reported in U.N.
Assembly Condemns Invasion Calls/or Troop Pullout, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1989, at Al7. In
the Security Council, a majority voted to condemn the invasion, but three permanent members
of the Council (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) vetoed the draft resolution. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg., at 18 - 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2902 (1989), reported
in Two Delegates Vying to Be the Voice of the New Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at
A12.
100. Gorbachev, supra note 30.
101. Id.
102. See Shevardnadze and Dumas at Press Conference, TASS DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 1990;
Paul Lewis, U.S. Seeks to Revive Panel that Enforces U.N. Decrees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990,
at A19 (U.S., reacting to Soviet proposal of previous week, recommends role for Military Staff
Committee in goods interdiction program).
103. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
See Eric Pace, Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at Al ("To make Soviet
agreement possible, the United States eliminated the phrase 'minimum force' and met a Soviet
request that any military actions be coordinated 'as appropriate' through a moribund United
Nations body, the Military Staff Committee.").
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With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, however, the United States pursued a unilateral approach, seeking international endorsement only
after the fact. It sent troops to Saudi Arabia without seeking U.N.
endorsement. 104 It instituted military interdiction of Iraqi shipping
unilaterally and then asked the Security Council to endorse that
course of conduct. 10s Only after building up its forces in Saudi Arabia
to a level adequate to invade Iraq did it ask the Security Council to
endorse an invasion. 106
The endorsement it sought and received, moreover, was not for
the kind of U.N. action contemplated by the U.N. Charter. 107 Chapter VII of the Charter calls for force organized and directed by the
Military Staff Committee. 108 The resolution on Iraq did not mention
the Military Staff Committee, but authorized any member state to
take unilateral action against Iraq. 109
The resolution authorized states to use "all necessary means" to
get Iraq out of Kuwait. Although the resolution did not expressly
mention the use of military force, it impliedly authorized it, but only
if such force was "necessary," meaning that other efforts had failed.
But economic sanctions were then in place against Iraq, and a strategy of negotiation based on the pressure created by those sanctions
held a prospect of success. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration
avoided negotiations with Iraq over issues whose resolution might
have led Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 110
The Bush Administration used military force for purposes that
went beyond getting Iraq out of Kuwait. By the time it began a
ground war against Iraq, the U.S.S.R. was close to an agreement with
Iraq for its pullout from Kuwait. Since there was a reasonable pros104. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to
Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al.
105. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
106. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (29 Nov. 1990).
107. Id.
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
109. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (29 Nov. 1990).
110. Such issues included Iraq - Kuwait financial disputes arising out of loans Kuwait
made to Iraq during the Iraq - Iran war, a dispute over a pool of oil under the two states'
border, and Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. They also included an international conference
on the Palestinian - Israeli question. Most states in the Security Council favored such a conference in principle and advocated speedy action on it as an inducement for Iraq to leave Kuwait.
But the U.S. administration refused to deal with that issue while Iraq occupied Kuwait. By
threat of veto, it prevented the Council from calling for a Palestinian - Israeli peace conference
at an early and definite date. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 2970th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/681
(1990) (see appended statement of Council president indicating that the permanent members
could not agree on an "appropriate time for such a conference").
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pect of Iraqi withdrawal, further force against Iraq was not a "necessary means." A few days after the ground war began, the U.S.S.R.
secured a firm commitment from Iraq to begin an immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. 111 Yet the Administration continued operations
several more days, for the apparent purpose of reducing Iraqi military
capability for the future.
In attacking Iraq, the United States did not adhere to the laws of
war, particularly in its aerial bombardment. Under the humanitarian
law, only military targets may be bombed. 112 The bombing in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities in Iraq hit public services such as electric
power plants, water pumping stations, and government office buildings. While these targets had some military significance, their primary purpose was civilian. A team from the U.N. investigated the
damage in Iraq and concluded that life in Iraq had been reduced to a
"pre-industrial age." 113 The bombing was largely responsible.
The record of U.S. participation in and support for international
organizations reflects a rejection of multilateral approaches and a
readiness to use heavy-handed methods by the Reagan and Bush Administration to get their way in these organizations. Even the United
States' handling of the Persian Gulf situation in 1990-91, cited by the
Bush Administration as an instance of multilateralism, involved primarily a unilateral approach by the United States. The symbolism
was not lost on the U.N. when Secretary of State Baker submitted
with one hand the draft resolution to authorize military force against
Iraq and with the other hand a partial payment on U.S. arrears. 114
The Bush Administration has not yet shown that it is prepared to
work with international organizations rather than to use them for its
own purposes. It has not yet indicated that it will comply with international organizations that try to restrain it from pursuing United
States policy objectives. If the rule of law is to prevail, the United
111. Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq Orders Troops to Leave Kuwait But U.S. Pursues Battlefield
Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al; Paul Lewis, A Diplomatic Flurry at U.N. Falls Short
of Deal on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at A12.
.
112. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 {lnt'l Comm.
Red Cross, 1977), art. 52 ("military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage"). See also id., art. 54 (prohibiting attack on drinking water
installations).
113. Excerpts from U.N. Report on Need for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at AS.
114. John M. Goshko, U.N. Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 1990, at Al.
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States, as a major power, must follow a more clearly multilateral
approach.
III.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE USE OF FORCE

The Panama and Iraq crises saw the United States using military
force abroad. Resort to armed force is perhaps the most difficult situation for the international community to regulate in its pursuit of the
rule of law. States may deem their interests so vital as to override
their regard for international processes. In recent years, the United
States has developed new rationales to justify the use of force. These
rationales must be explored to determine whether they are compatible
with the rule of law.
The shift in the United States' international practice in the 1980s,
as reflected in its participation in international organizations, was in
part a product of the Reagan Administration's highly ideological approach to international relations. President Reagan's characterization
of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" lent an East-West element to
issues that had little to do with superpower politics.
Prior post-War administrations, to be sure, had viewed the EastW est confrontation as the overriding factor in international relations
and had injected it in situations where it played little role. us Prior
administrations, as they intervened militarily abroad, had typically
either lied about what they were doing or skewed the facts to make it
appear that they were acting within some accepted international-law
principle. 116 But the Reagan Administration developed a theory that
asserted the lawfulness of providing material aid to insurgencies that
represent "democratic forces" against "totalitarian governments." 117
The accepted view is that, in a civil war, an outside state must keep
hands off, at least if no other state has aided one of the contending
parties. 118
115. See, e.g., A Case Study of the Effect of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, 24 TEXAS J. INT'L
L. 463, 477 - 78, 483 - 84 (1989)(the handling by President Lyndon Johnson of the Dominican
Republic civil strife in 1965).
116. See generally JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RUSES OF WAR: PRETEXT IN AMERICA'S DECISIONS TO FIGHT (forthcoming 1992)(on file with author).
117. Franck & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 3 - 4.
118. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1642 (1984); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9
l.L.M. 1292 (1970); Nicaragua case, supra note 16, at 109 - 10 (Merits) (aid to insurgency
prohibited by customary law).
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Military Intervention

The Reagan Administration's willingness to resort to armed
force was dramatically displayed in its policy towards Nicaragua.
Opposing Nicaragua on ideological grounds, the Reagan Administration went well beyond simply aiding a contending party. It fomented
and organized an insurgency to bring down the government of Nicaragua.119 It set up and financed an external opposition and directed
its efforts. Keeping "the democratic resistance [contras] alive in Nicaragua," President Reagan said, was necessary to "prevent[] the Soviets from establishing a beachhead in Central America. . . . [T]hose
who govern in Nicaragua chose to tum their country over to the Soviet Union to be a base for communist expansion on the American
mainland." 120 The Administration set mines in the waters of Nicaragua's major port and attacked oil depots at that port.1 21 The ICJ
found that the mining, the attacks, and the organization of an insurgent force constituted aggression. 12 2
The Reagan Administration also encouraged neighboring states
to oppose Nicaragua. 123 It militarized Honduras as a counterweight
to Nicaragua.1 24 It set up contra training bases in Panama 12s and convinced Costa Rica to forego its traditional policy of not maintaining
119. See Joel Brinkley, Rebel Asserts C.LA. Pledged Help in War Against Sandinistas,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1984, at Al (citing statement of former contra leader Edgar Chamorro);
Edgar Chamorro, Confessions of a 'Contra', NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. S, 198S, at 18, 18 - 19.
120. President Ronald Reagan, Iran-Contra Controversy and President's Goals, (Aug. 12,
1987), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1987, at 4 - S (excerpts of Reagan's address to the
nation).
121. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at SO - SI.
122. Id. at 128.
123. BoB WOODWARD, THE VEIL: THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA 1981-1987, 233
(1987).
124. See James LeMoyne, Army Games Due with Hondurans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
l 98S, at A6 (7000 Gls took part in military exercises in Honduras; use of pilotless aircraft for
reconnaissance missions over El Salvador); Nicaragua Protests War Games, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, l 98S, at A3 (U.S. troop presence in Honduras "increases tension and unrest in the region"); Gerald M. Boyd, Honduras Is Told U.S. Will Defend It, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 198S, at
AS (Reagan promises to defend Honduras "against communist aggression"); Richard Halloran, G.L Training: Build a Road in Honduras, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 198S, at A4 (construction of roads, airstrips; exercises a show of force to caution Nicaragua); WOODWARD, supra
note 123, at 312 (Honduras exercises "gunboat diplomacy to scare neighboring Nicaragua").
12S. See WOODWARD, supra note 123, at 229, 233; Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Aides Say
Panama General Proposed Sabotage in Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1987, at Al (Administration officials said Gen. Noriega offered to undertake sabotage, possibly in Nicaragua, and
that Adm. John Poindexter decided to run sabotage operations.); JONATHAN MARSHALL ET
AL., THE IRAN CONNECTION: SECRET TEAMS AND COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE REAGAN
ERA 99 (1987) (Panama channeling aid to "contras" in Costa Rica).
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armed forces. 126
In 1987, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El
Salvador called for a withdrawal of outside military aid and a negotiated end to all insurgencies in the region. The Administration ignored the request and continued military aid to the contras and to the
government of El Salvador, which was involved in a major civil
war. 127 It justified this aid as necessary to pressure Nicaragua and the
Salvadoran insurgents to negotiate, although most other states involved thought the aid prolonged the hostilities. 128 The Reagan Administration violated a ceasefire that had been arranged between the
contras and the Nicaraguan government by giving direct cash aid to
the contras and by encouraging the contras to refuse to negotiate. 129

B.

Opposition to Self-Determination

The Reagan Administration's opposition to self-determination
was demonstrated by its policies in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. In the Middle East, the Reagan Administration also followed
a path that put it at odds with the rule of law. It rejected the demand
for statehood of the Palestinian Arab people. It provided substantial
military and economic aid to Israel, which Israel used to maintain its
occupation of the Arab territory it occupied in 1967. That occupation
was viewed by the U.N. Security Council as unlawful. 130 Given the
fact that Israel used either the funds directly coming from the U.S. or
other funds thereby available to it to maintain the unlawful occupation, the provision of this aid by the U.S. was unlawful. 131 The U.N.
126. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Military Advisers to Train Costa Rican Police, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1985, at A17 (training in counter-insurgency to cope with perceived threat from Nicaragua); Joel Brinkley, Costa Ricans at Odds over U.S. Army Advisers, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1985, at A16 (neutrality hard to maintain because of dependence on U.S. economic aid; some
Costa Ricans oppose U.S. effort to militarize country; U.S. military aid to Costa Rica began in
1981).
127. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Envoys told to Convey Doubt Over Latin Plan, N.Y.TIMES, Aug.
18, 1987, at Al.
128. Neil A. Lewis, Contra Aid a Key, U.S. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1987, at
A9; Peter Ford, Central American Peace Summit: Recriminations or Renewed Resolve?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1988, at 7 (International Verification and Follow-up Commission of the peace plan, consisting of five Central American and eight other Latin American
governments, plus the U.N. and 0.A.S., which reported in Jan. 1988 that "the definitive end"
of U.S. aid to the contras "continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of
peace efforts").
129. Kenneth E. Sharpe, Did U.S., Contras Sabotage the Peace Talks?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 1988 at El.
130. S.C. Res. 476, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 35, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36
(1980).
131. John Quigley, United States Complicity in Israel's Violations of Palestinian Rights,
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Security Council called on states not to provide Israel with assistance
to establish settlements of its own citizens in the occupied territories,
because it found such settlements illegal. 132
The Reagan Administration also set up roadblocks to self-determination in southern Africa. It increased cooperation with the government of South Africa by letting it buy commodities with military
application. 133 This violated Security Council resolutions aimed at
pressuring South Africa to end apartheid. 134 When bills were introduced in Congress to limit United States investment in South Africa,
the Administration opposed them. 13 s When Congress passed a sanctions bill, it had to overcome a presidential veto to implement its
plan. 136 The Administration continued to oppose sanctions. 137
To justify its weak stand on self-determination, the Reagan Administration characterized the African National Congress, the major
opposition group, as "Soviet-armed guerrillas" 138 that used "calculated terror," 139 and whose goals reflected "continuing close ties via
the South African Communist Party to its Soviet counterpart." 140 As
in Central America, it was inserting an ideological element into an
issue where that was at best a marginal factor.
On the related issue of Namibia, the Administration thwarted a
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 95-120 (1984). See generally John Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77
(1986).
132. S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 35, at 5, Res. & Dees. U.N. Doc.
S/INF/36 (1980).
133. Kenneth S. Zinn, US-SA: A Fusion of Interests, SOUTHERN AFRICA, Sept. 1982, at
13.
134. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 32, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33
(1978), reprinted in 16 l.L.M. 1548 (1977).
135. Jonathan Fuerbinger, House Votes Sanctions Against South Africa, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 1985, at Al; Jonathan Fuerbinger, Senate Approves Economic Moves Against S. Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1985, at Al; President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1985, at B8 (opposes sanctions legislation); Bernard Gwertzman & Bernard Weinraub, Reagan, in Reversal, Orders Sanctions Against South Africa; Move Causes Split
in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al.
136. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5001 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1991), Pub. L. No. 99 - 440, 100 Stat. 1086 (Presidential veto overridden by 100 Stat.
1116).
137. United States Policy Options Toward South Africa, 1988: Hearings on S. 2378 before
the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, lOOth Cong.,
1st Sess. 84 (1988)(statement of John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State).
138. President Ronald Reagan, Ending Apartheid in South Africa, Address Before
World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association (July 22, 1986), reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Sept. 1986, at l, 4.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Misconceptions About U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept.
1986, at 15.
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process that could have achieved independence in the early 1980s.
South Africa, as the administering power in Namibia since World
War I, introduced apartheid in Namibia, in violation of its obligation
to promote self-determination. 141 The U.N. General Assembly and
Security Council both called on South Africa to withdraw, but it refused.142 In 1978, the Security Council established a process to lead
to independence. 143 A "contact group" of five Westem states (including the United States) negotiated with South Africa and by 1982 was
close to an agreement for early elections in Namibia.
In 1982, however, South Africa stated that it would not withdraw from Namibia so long as Cuba maintained troops in Angola,
where the Administration covertly provided material aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), a
South Africa-supported insurgency. 144 The Administration backed
South Africa's linking of the issue of Cuban troops in Angola with
that of independence for Namibia and stopped urging South Africa to
hold the Namibia elections. 14s
The Administration took up the issue again only in 1988, chairing talks with Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. As a result, a
ceasefire was declared, South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola
and South Africa let Namibia hold elections that led to its independence.146 But the Reagan Administration declared that it would continue to aid U.N.I.T.A. 147 The Bush Administration also continued
141. For Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
l.C.J. 57.
142. S.C. Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1529th mtg., Res. & Dees. at 1 - 2, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/25 (1970). G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2 - 3, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
143. S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2087th mtg., Res. & Dees., at 13, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/34 (1979).
144. Bernard Gwertzman, President Decides to Send Weapons to Angola Rebels, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1986, at Al; James Brooke, CLA. Said to Send Weapons via Zaire to Angola
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1987, at Al; WOODWARD, supra note 123, at 426.
145. ISAAK I. DORE, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA 169
(1985); Negotiations: SWAPO Denounces Western Stalling, SOUTHERN AFRICA, Oct. 1982, at 4
- 5; Bernard Gwertzman, President Decides to Send Weapons to Angola Rebels, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1986, at A3; George Shultz, Southern Africa: Toward an American Consensus, Address Before National Press Club (Apr. 16, 1985), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1985, at 22;
Francis A. Boyle, Creating the State of Palestine, 4 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 15, 27 (1987 88)(on Administration actions that obstructed Namibia independence).
146. Christopher S. Wren, Election in Namibia Worries Whites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1989, at A3.
147. John D. Battersby, Pretoria Finishes Its Angola Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1988,
at A3; Robert Pear, 4 Nations Agree on Cuban Pullout from Angola War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1988, at Al.
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that aid. 148
By impeding self-determination in South Africa and Namibia,
the Reagan Administration blocked the effectuation of the legal rights
of the populations of those states. By aiding U.N.I.T.A., it unlawfully
intervened in a civil conflict in Angola.
If the rule of law is to prevail, the United States must take a
stricter view of the permissible use of armed force. At the same time,
it must support the effectuation of self-determination and must not
interfere financially or militarily to block self-determination.
C.

Terrorism

One aspect of international life that led to the formulation by the
United States of new rationales for use of armed force was terrorism.
As the cold war diminished, so too did the use of anti-communism as
a rationale for military intervention. "Notwithstanding the alteration
in the Soviet threat," President Bush said, "the world remains a dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests wholly
unrelated to the earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship." 149
General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, said:
If we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their
resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations,
and deter conflict, we must maintain within our active force structure
a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to
respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence throughout the
globe.lSO

General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, said that "because the
United States is a global power with vital interests that must be protected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look beyond the European continent and consider other threats to our
national security."1s1
The insertion of a military force in Saudi Arabia in 1990 showed
that President Bush was willing to take action on this line of thinking.
The ideology of intervention was shifting from anti-communism to
one of maintaining the U.S. predominance in the Third World, primarily to ensure access to natural resources. That ideology, like anti148. Michael Clough, U.S. Administration Keeps Cold War Hot in Angola, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1990, at M2.
149. Maureen Dowd, Backing Pentagon, Bush Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A13.
150. Michael Klare, Policing the Gulf-and the World, NATION, Oct. 15, 1990, at 420.
151. Id. at 418.
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communism, put the United States at odds with international legality,
which prohibits intervention to enhance a state's financial or material
position. 152
One aspect of the ideology of the Reagan and Bush Administrations has been a strong emphasis on opposing terrorism. To the extent that actual terrorism is targeted, there is, to be sure, nothing
objectionable. However, the two Administrations have defined terrorism broadly, to give themselves latitude to use force in situations in
which it is not justifiable.
This emphasis on terrorism grew out of President Reagan's effective political use of the Carter Administration's inability to get U.S.
personnel out of Iran. The Reagan Administration used an anti-terrorist rationale to justify actions it took on ideological grounds. 153 It
commissioned, from the Central Intelligence Agency, a study of the
frequency of terrorist acts. The Agency concluded that terrorist attacks against United States citizens were declining. 154 Since that finding did not suit the Administration's planned use of the anti-terrorism
rationale, it asked the Agency to re-do the study using a broader definition of terrorism. The second study showed terrorist attacks against
United States citizens to be increasing. 155
When it invaded Grenada, the Reagan Administration's motive
was to overthrow a government allied with Cuba. 156 President Reagan gave, however, as one of several justifications, that Grenada was
"being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time," he said.1 57 The Administration also cited its supposed concern that the government of
Grenada might take United States' citizens resident in Grenada as
hostages. 1ss An Administration official, referring to undisclosed doc152. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
153. See John Quigley, Eliminating Terrorism: A Law and Justice Approach, 3 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 47, 53 - 55 (1987); Robert Charvin, La Doctrine Americaine de la "Souverainete
Limitee" [The American Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty], 20 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INT'L .5, 20 - 22 (1987).
154. Francis A. Boyle, The Law Is An Ass, AFRICAN EVENTS, May-June 1986, at 51, 53.
155. Id.
156. Dore, supra note 20, at 12; John Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada:
Stranger than Fiction, 18 INTER-AM. L. REV. 271, 316 - 17 (1987).
157. Ronald Reagan, America's Commitment to Peace, Address to the Nation (Oct. 27,
1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1983, at 1, 4.
158. Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec.
1983, at 75 (statement of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to United Nations). See also, Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, id. at 80. U.S. Military Actions in Grenada:
Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, Hearing before the Subcommittees on
International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House
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uments, said:
It is clear from these documents and other information we now have

that serious consideration was being given to seizing Americans as
hostages and holding them for reasons that are not entirely clear, but
seem to involve an effort to embarrass the United States and, more
immediately, to forestall American military action in Grenada.ts 9

The Administration did not make public these or any other documents to substantiate its claim of a possible hostage-taking. When the
United States invaded, Grenadian officials treated United States citizens courteously, even during the combat that led to their removal
and arrest. 160 It seems probable that the Administration invented the
specter of a hostage-taking as a pretext for its invasion.
The Administration exploited terrorism to get support for another ideologically motivated enterprise, its military operation against
Nicaragua. In asking Congress to fund the operation, President Reagan referred to "[l]inks between the Sandinistas, the PLO and Libyans" and suggested that a refusal to finance the contras would make
Nicaragua "a refuge and safe haven for terrorism" and would "result
in the creation of another Libya on our doorstep." 161 He said:
"[g]athered in Nicaragua already are ... all the elements of international terrorism-from the P.L.O. to Italy's Red Brigades." 162 President Reagan did not substantiate these alleged linkages.
The Reagan Administration invoked its efforts against terrorism
to justify two other legally suspect military actions against ideological
opponents. In 1985 it forcibly diverted an Egyptian aircraft over international waters in the Mediterranean Sea, to detain persons on
board whom it suspected of participation in the hijacking of the
Achille Lauro cruise ship. 163 It justified the violation of international
airspace on the grounds that the suspected hijackers, or perhaps other
hijackers, might be planning terrorist attacks against United States'
citizens in the future. President Reagan stated that his aim was to
"sen[d] a message to terrorists everywhere, ... [y]ou can run but you
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1983)(remarks of Deputy Secretary of
State Kenneth Dam).
159. Philip Taubman, U.S. Reports Evidence of Island Hostage Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1983, at A14 (the official was identified as "senior" but was not named).
160. See Quigley, supra note 156, at 280.
161. Gerald Boyd, Reagan Presses Hard for Contra Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1986, at A5.
162. Transcript of the President's Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at A12.
163. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hijackers; Fighters Direct It to
NATO Base in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial in Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at
Al.
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can't hide." 164 The Administration did not claim to possess evidence
of specific future attacks, and there is no reason to believe that it had
any.
In 1986, the Reagan Administration bombed Libya, causing
deaths and property damage. 165 It asserted as one justification that
Libya was likely to undertake future terrorist attacks. 166 It said that it
had evidence about planned attacks on United States' facilities but did
not make that evidence public. 167
Similarly, the Administration asserted a novel theory to justify
the seizure of suspected terrorists abroad. It said that it is lawful to
enter another state, without its consent, to capture suspected terrorists.168 Under international law, however, police agents of one
state are not permitted to operate in another state without that state's
permission. 169 Specifically, they may not do so to seize suspects. 170
The Administration issued an instruction, however, that United
States authorities should seize suspected terrorists in other states and
bring them by force to the United States for trial, even if the other
state did not give permission. It supported this instruction on a theory of self-defense, citing the possibility that the suspected terrorist
might carry out a new terrorist attack in the future.1 71
This rationale stretched self-defense to the breaking point, however. The supposition that a person suspected of terrorism may carry
out a future terrorist attack is hardly an "armed attack" under the
U.N. Charter. The necessary degree of imminence is lacking, and the
attack, presumably aimed at a citizen, is not in any event an act of
aggression.
164. Transcript of White House News Conference on the Hijacking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1985, at A6.
165. Seymour Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6, at 17.
166. Bernard Gwertzman, Plots on Global Scale Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at
Al.
167. Id.; Announcement by Speakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al3.
168. John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from
Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 193 (1988).
169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 433 (1987) (stating that "[l]aw enforcement officers of the United States" may "exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with . . . the consent of the other
state").
170. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974) (capture without consent of territorial state violates sovereignty of that state); S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR, 15th
Sess., Res. & Dees., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/INF/15/Rev.1 (1960) (unconsented intrusion by Israel
into Argentina to capture Adolf Eichmann for trial on charges of crimes against humanity
found to be unlawful).
171. John Walcott et al., Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Overseas Is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 1 (quoting Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese).
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The Reagan Administration put the terrorism label on self-determination movements, like the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
the African National Congress in South Africa, and South West African People's Organization in Namibia. It used that characterization
as a basis for refusing to submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent, a treaty to protect the victims of war. Protocol I to the four
1949 Geneva humanitarian conventions expanded international protections for combatants and civilians in international armed conflict.172 Protocol I, which had been signed by President Carter,
characterized as international those armed conflicts in which peoples
fight against "colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." 173
President Reagan said that this provision promoted terrorism: "The
repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological level
so important to terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors." 174 The State Department's Legal Adviser termed the concept of self-determination a "justification for
terrorist acts." 17s This position inaccurately equated terrorism and
the pursuit of self-determination by military means.
Under the banner of anti-terrorism, the Reagan Administration
proposed action against United States citizens who supported self-determination movements. It sought passage of a 1984 anti-terrorism
bill to outlaw "logistical, mechanical, maintenance, or similar support
services to the armed forces or any intelligence agency, or their
agents" of a "terrorist group." 176 The State Department would have
designated which organizations were "terrorist." 177 The proposal was
rejected by Congress, where it was criticized for the broad power it
would give the Administration. 178
The Administration used terrorism as a pretext to investigate
172. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 16 l.L.M. 1391 (1977).
173. Id. , art. 1., para. 4.
174. Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the Senate of the United States, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L . 910, 912 (1987).
175. Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOR. AFF. 901, 904 (1986).
176. H.R. 5613, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H3561 (1984); Legislation to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on H.R. 5613 Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-53 (1983)(statement of Willard A. DePree, Acting Under Secretary of State
for Management)[hereinafter Legislation to Combat International Terrorism]; Leslie Gelb, Administration Debating Antiterrorist Measures, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1984, at A6.
177. H.R. 5613, supra note 176, ~ 2.
178. Legislation to Combat International Terrorism, supra, note 176, at 55 - 56 (comments of Rep. Dan Mica), 57 - 63 (comments of Rep. Stephen Solarz).
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United States citizens who opposed its policy of aiding the Salvadoran
government in its civil war. In 1981, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) commenced surveillance of the Committee in Support of
the People of El Salvador (C.I.S.P.E.S.). The FBI file on the investigation was headed "CISPES - International Terrorism," 179 although
the FBI had no basis for suspecting terrorism by C.I.S.P.E.S. 180
C.I.S.P.E.S., as the investigation disclosed, carried out only lawful activity. Despite the lack of evidence of criminal activity, the F.B.I.
continued the investigation for five years. 18 1
The Justice Department also used anti-terrorism as a pretext for
a contingency plan it devised to expel aliens of Middle East origin
from the United States. The Investigation Division of the Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service produced a document
titled "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan," that
contemplated the possible incarceration and deportation of large
numbers of Algerians, Libyans, Tunisians, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, Moroccans, and Lebanese, 182 on the theory that nationals of
these countries might be terrorists. 183
The Justice Department's Alien Border Control Committee established a "working group" charged with the "development of visa
restrictions for aliens from certain countries or aliens of certain categories who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the
United States." 184 Another working group was charged with carrying
out the "expulsion from the United States of alien activists who are
not in conformity with their immigration status and expeditious deportation of aliens engaged in support of terrorism." 1ss
These plans were aimed less at terrorists than at supporters of
self-determination movements. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service employed a definition of "terrorism" that included the lawful
use of force in support of self-determination. This overbroad defini179. Jonathan A. Bennett, Webster Lied on CISPES Spying, GUARDIAN (London), Feb.
10, 1988, at 1.
180. Jerry Berman, FBI Spies on Central America Protesters, CIVIL LIBERTIES (American
Civil Liberties Union), Winter 1988, at 1.
181. Philip Shenon, F.B.L Papers Show Wide Surveillance of Reagan Critics, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1988, at Al (The F.B.I. said that its investigation was based on reports of "alleged
criminal activity,'' but it disclosed nothing more.).
182. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Investigation Division, Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan 16 (May 1986) (unpublished government document on file
with author).
183. See id. at 19, 24.
184. Robert J. Walsh, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alien Border Control Committee, at 1 (unpublished government document on file with author).
185. Id. at 2.
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tion was reflected in deportation proceedings it commenced against
eight Palestinian aliens (citizens of Jordan) and one Kenyan, accusing
them of membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It acknowledged that it did not have evidence of plans to commit terrorist acts but alleged that the individuals had distributed
brochures of the Popular Front. 186 These proceedings, in apparent
conformity with the plans set in the quoted 1986 Department of Justice documents, threatened the status of resident aliens based on their
nationality and support for self-determination movements.
While terrorism is a phenomenon that states must confront, they
must not use it as a basis for inventing new and spurious rationales for
the use of armed force. Just as in the domestic context the fight
against crime must be kept within certain limits to preserve fundamental values, so in the international context the fight against terrorism must not encroach on other important values. For the rule of law
to succeed, the United States must confine its anti-terrorist activities
to appropriate channels.

D.

New Approaches to the Law of Self-Defense

The primary justification for the use of armed force against another state is self-defense. States that use armed force in legally dubious circumstances typically depict their actions as defensive. Much
controversy surrounds the definition of the outer limits of self-defense.
If the rule of law is to prevail, self-defense must not become so large a
category as to permit the use of force in situations in which the necessity for it is not actually present.
When called upon to justify the use of military force, the Reagan
and Bush Administrations asserted views on the use of armed force
that contradicted the U.N. Charter's strict prohibition. This posture
posed a challenge to international legality, because the new positions
asserted by the two administrations threatened to broaden permissible
use of force to the point that the Charter would be seriously
weakened.
The two Administrations stretched the accepted doctrine in three
respects: on the use of force in anticipation of force by an adversary,
on the use of force to protect citizens, and on the permissible limits on
the amount of force used in self-defense.
186. Mary Thornton & Howard Kurtz, Rights Groups Question Arrest of Palestinians,
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1987, at A28. See also Lena Williams, 9 Aliens' Arrests Laid to Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1987, at AlO; Editorial: McCarran-Walter Strikes Again, N.Y. TIMES,
March 21, 1987, at A26 (the individuals denied membership in the Popular Front).
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Self-defense in anticipation of an attack is a disputed doctrine,
because the U.N. Charter requires an "armed attack" for invocation
of self-defense. 187 Publicists who support the doctrine, and states invoking it, have said that the force anticipated must be imminent. 188
The Reagan and Bush Administrations, however, routinely ignored
the requirement of imminence in invoking self-defense. In the bombing of Libya and the invasions of Grenada and Panama, they did not
claim that the attacks they purported to anticipate from those states
would occur imminently. Further, the Reagan and Bush Administrations argued that an attack on a United States citizen abroad, at the
instigation of a state, was an "armed attack" against the United
States, under the Charter. On the basis of possible future attacks on
United States citizens the invasion of Panama was justified. 189
This position represented a dangerous expansion of permissible
force. The U.N. Charter prohibits "force against the territorial integrity or political independence" of a state. 190 The General Assembly's
definition of aggression, which lists acts constituting aggression, does
not mention attacks against citizens. 191 A State's use of force against
citizens of another state is not an attack on that state. It violates the
rights of that state but is not aggression against it. 192
In the Nicaragua litigation, the Reagan Administration expanded the proportionality requirement, an accepted limitation on the
force used in self-defense. A state acting in self-defense may use only
such force as is necessary to repel an attack. 193 The proportionality
rule does not limit a defending state to the use of force precisely
equivalent to that used against it, 194 but it does discourage responsive
force that is substantially greater. 195
187. See U.N. CHARTER art 51; PHILIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 - 67
(1948); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 - 45 (1979).
188. DEREK BoWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 - 93 (1958) (imminence must be evident).
189. 136 CONG. REC. S12 (Daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy listing
justifications put forward by the Administration on Panama and stating, "Nothing on the
public record makes any of these justifications persuasive").
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
191. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, art. 3, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), re-printed in 13
l.L.M. 710, 713 - 14 (1974).
192. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 504 · ~ 34 (1973).
193. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 261 64 (1963) [hereinafter USE OF FORCE]; Schachter, supra note 118, at 1637 - 38; BowETT,
supra note 188, at 105 (as applied to force against another state to assist endangered nationals).
194. USE OF FORCE, supra note 193, at 264.
195. Schachter, supra note 118, at 1637.
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The Administration said that it was justified in using force
against Nicaragua on the grounds that Nicaragua had carried out an
armed attack against El Salvador by providing logistical and material
aid to an insurgency there.1 96 The ICJ, however, found little evidence
of material aid by Nicaragua to Salvadoran insurgents at the relevant
time period and thus did not have to decide whether the United
States' force was proportional. 197 But, even if Nicaragua had been
aiding the Salvadoran insurgents, the United States exceeded proportionality by mining Nicaragua's harbors, blowing up its major oil storage depots 198 and by organizing and funding the contra insurgency. 199
In its invasion of Panama, the Bush Administration also asserted
self-defense in a fashion that exceeded the bounds of proportionality.
If Panama was about to attack United States citizens, as the Administration alleged, the level of force employed by the United States was
excessive. 200 It used 24,500 troops and overthrew Panama's govemment.201 United States aircraft attacking the military headquarters in
Panama City levelled several nearby city blocks. 202 The invasion resulted in deaths estimated in the thousands. 203 Several thousand more
were hospitalized for wounds. 204
The United States' recent invocations of self-defense are not pro196. Nicaragua Case, supra note 16, at 117 - 24, paras. 189 - 202 (referring to U.S.
Counter-Memorial).
197. Id. at 86 para. 160 (merits).
198. Id. at 50 - 51 para. 86.
199. Id. at 53 - 63 paras. 92 - 112.
200. Bill McAllister, U.S. Cites Self-Defense; Legal Scholars Skeptical, WASH. Pos-r, Dec.
21, 1989, at A36 (quotes Prof. Oscar Schachter that invasion might well have violated requirement of proportionality); John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama,
15 YALE J. INT'L L. 276, 296 (1990).
201. Molly Moore & Ann Devroy, Officials Say Panama Taking More Time and Troops
Than Expected, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at A6.
202. Brook Larmer, With the Dictator Disabled, Panama Looks to Rebuild, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1989, at 1.
203. See Andrew Rosenthal, No More Panamas, Bush Aides Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1990, at A9 (estimate of 400 deaths by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, estimate of a minimum of 1000 deaths by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark); David E. Pitt,
The Invasion's Civilian Toll: Still No Official Count, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1990, at A9; Panama
sumida en el caos y Noriega continua pr6fugo, LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 1
(representative of overthrown Panama government estimated 6000 to 7000 killed); Acusan a
EE. UU. de esconder una matanza, LA PRENSA (Buenos Aires), Dec. 26, 1989, at 2 (Red Cross
representative says "at least two thousand killed; the morgues of the hospitals are overflowing
and there is no more room"); J. D. Gannon, Invasion Took Its Toll in Deaths, Human Suffering, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1989, at 3 (estimate of 1000 civilians killed).
204. See Brook Larmer, In Invasion's Wake, Disorder Reigns in Panamanian Capital,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1 (over 1000 wounded);
Military Intervention in Panama, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, Bulletin (No. 169), Feb. 1990, at 2 (hospitals in
Panama City "inundated with civilian and military casualties," "[o]ver 800 people were
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pitious from the standpoint of the rule of law in the world community. As the state most capable of bringing armed force to bear
against others, the United States has a special responsibility to abide
by the agreed rules. There is little hope for the rule of law if the
United States does not accept international strictures.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If a new world order is to emerge, it must be based on an adherence to legality by the United States, a principal player in that new
order. The United States' recent record, however, gives little cause
for optimism about its willingness to abide by international norms in
its dealings with other states, particularly in regard to the Third
World. As before, the United States enjoys a preponderance in economic clout and military force and has shown itself reluctant to refrain from using them when it is to their advantage.
Regrettably, the recent international practice of the United
States has reflected a disregard for multilateral process and international law. One analyst said, "in a variety of unilateral maneuvers,
such as the withdrawal from UNESCO, the operations in Grenada,
the closure of the PLO liaison office at the United Nations, and the
failure to pay full U.N. dues, the United States has largely isolated
itself from world public and legal opinion. " 20s That assessment is,
unfortunately, accurate. The Persian Gulf actions of 1990-91 have
further isolated the United States from public opinion in that region.
The rationale for eschewing multilateral approaches was, supposedly, to promote the United States' national interests. However, a
lawful foreign policy better serves national interests, because it can
ensure the mutual respect necessary to inter-state cooperation. 206
"The costs of continuing on a separatist course are various, ranging
from its direct effect on foreign opinion, to its effect on the overall
systemic consideration of the value of strengthening the rule of law
internationally by allowing for judicial resolution of disputes." 207
Only in a law-abiding world community can states and individuals be
protected and work together to solve vital international problems.
treated during the first few days," "medicines and medical material were in short supply,"
l.C.R.C. brought in two planeloads of medical supplies to make up the shortfall).
205. Detlev Vagts, Going to Court, Internationally, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1712, 1717 (1989)
(reviewing THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1987)).
206. Bums H. Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus International Law, 19 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295, 298 - 300 (1987).
207. Vagts, supra note 205, at 1717.
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And only a law-abiding state has a moral base from which to call
other states to account when they violate international law.
If the United States continues to use military force on legally
dubious grounds, it is unlikely that the world will be, in President
Bush's words, "freer from the threat of terror." To the extent that the
United States is perceived as using force inappropriately, those who
sympathize with the objects of that force will be encouraged to resort
to terrorism, because it provides an available, even if ineffective
response.
If the world is to be, in President Bush's words, "stronger in the
pursuit of justice," the United States must change its attitude towards
international adjudication and must not use military force in ways
that violate the rights of other states and peoples.
If, in President Bush's words, the world is to be "more secure in
the quest for peace," the United States must pursue non-forceful
mechanisms more diligently.
Other states besides the United States, to be sure, must adhere to
the rule of law if it is to succeed at the universal level. The United
States cannot pursue a rule of law approach if others do not. However, the record of recent years is that the United States has been one
of the more frequent lawbreakers. As a powerful state, the significance of that lawbreaking is magnified. If the United States as the
state with the greatest military potential is not committed to the rule
of law, prospects for its achievement are dim. The end of the cold war
has opened the prospect for a higher level of law-adherence in world
community relations. 208 That opportunity must be seized.
For most of this century, unfortunately, the United States has
shown itself willing to pursue economic and political interests in ways
that violate the rights of other states. That is the background to the
practices recounted above. The United States developed a pattern of
military intervention in Latin America early in the century, when
President Theodore Roosevelt claimed a right to intervene in countries that defaulted on their public debt. 209 After World War II the
pattern was extended to the rest of the Third World. The cold war
provided a new impetus and rationale for intervention.
The creation of the United Nations, the Organization of Ameri208. John Quigley, Law for a World Community, 16 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1
(1989).
209. Protocol Providing for the Collection and Disbursement of the Dominican Republic's Customs Revenues by the U.S., February 7, 1905, FOR. RELS. U.S. 1905 at 334 (Feb. 15,
1905).

Published by SURFACE, 1992

35

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 6

110

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 18:75

can States, and other organizations, held a hope of curbing unilateral
intervention. But if the rule of law at the universal level is to prevail,
the United States must commit itself to follow multilateral processes.
The Bush Administration, in comparison with the Reagan Administration, has made minor steps towards more harmonious inter-action
with other states. It has begun to pay arrears to the United Nations.
It is not operating on the prior cold war assumptions. However, it
has created its own ideology that suggests a need to use military force
to maintain dominance abroad. It has not distanced itself from the
Reagan Administration's disregard of legality in the use of force. It
has unlawfully used military force itself. It has not re-joined
UNESCO.
The concept of a new order in which states interact harmoniously is a laudable ideal. All states should work to achieve this kind
of world. Before it can gain a following on its initiative, however, the
United States must demonstrate its willingness to comply with international norms more fully.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/6

36

